Several policymakers and other experts have called China’s behavior, especially its activities in the South and East China Seas, ‘aggressive.’ This article compares China’s behavior with a suggested definition of ‘aggression’ based on the one enshrined in international law, and it finds that these experts’ use of the term ‘aggressive’ is inconsistent with this definition.
President of Israel Reuven Rivlin is calling for a dialogue among four “tribes” to develop a framework for a society-wide partnership in Israel.
Self Determination is the process by which people, who are governed by a foreign power, gain self government. Often the people first form a sense of community - a sense of a shared identity, destiny, and core values - and then seek to invest those in a state, forming a nation. The term self determination is also used to refer to the normative principle that is evoked to justify breaking away from the old regime to form a new one.
Has the US military become a learning institution, one able to transition from relying on a conventional war model to fighting against irregular adversaries such as insurgents and terrorists? This article examines the United States' interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to respond to this question.
In response to China’s military modernization and growing anti-access/area denial capabilities, the US military has adopted an ‘‘Air Sea Battle’’ (ASB) concept entailing extensive strikes on the Chinese mainland. Critics argue that ASB creates grave escalation risks and may incite an expensive arms race. Less discussed, but also of serious concern, is that ASB was adopted with little to no civilian oversight, in a case of ‘‘structural inattention.’’ It has also been facilitated by ‘‘subterranean factors’’ including the interests of influential military contractors and the military’s own inclination toward conventional warfare.
Full article here.
Amitai Etzioni’s communitarian perspective offers a comprehensive approach to international affairs in addition to offering guidance for domestic policy. His argument that a focus on traditional “realist” concerns for a nation’s security and interests (“security first”), combined with a dialogue over competing moral imperatives, is more likely to lead to the emergence of an idealist end state--a sustainable international community. His emphasis on gradualism--of breaking apart complex policy goals into small, discrete steps--comes from his assessment that this is a better way of promoting lasting change in the international system. His perspective does not fit neatly into any of the dominant U.S. foreign policy approaches, but his ideas have formed part of the foreign policy debate for the last fifty years.
Full article here.
This article asks which normative framework should be applied in determining whether privacy is unduly diminished in the American quest for enhanced protection against terrorist attacks; which specific criteria should be employed in determining whether the balance has tilted too far toward enhancing security or protecting privacy; and which measures can be taken to reduce the inevitable conflict between security and privacy. It also seeks to show that enhanced transparency is inferior to enhanced accountability, although there is some room for adding more of both kinds of scrutiny.
“Who Authorized Preparations for War With China,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, June, 2013.
Washington's decision to drap on Japan to contain China may seem wise, but such a move is certain to deeply offend and mobilize China
“Accommodating China“, Survival, April-May 2013. Chinese Translation: “阿米塔伊·埃兹欧尼：与中国和解.”
“Learning the Lessons of Afghanistan,” The National Interest, August 30, 2012.
Little America should be required reading for all military personnel sent overseas, replacing the fake Three Cups of Tea, which was warmly embraced by naive generals who bet on nation building under the guise of the COIN (counterinsurgency) strategy. The book is a detailed report of our failed policies in Afghanistan by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, a leading Washington Post reporter. It uses an early episode in U.S.-Afghan relations as a revealing and emblematic tale of why the United States suffers from a severe case of what I previously called Multiple Realism Deficiency Disorder
There is a growing consensus that the United States can't afford another war, or even a major armed humanitarian intervention. But in reality, the cost of war itself is not the critical issue. It is the nation building following many wars that drives up the costs.
When President Obama unveiled his military budget earlier this year, it was clear that he was essentially putting a new defense strategy on the table.
As Syria descends into civil war, the international community again finds itself debating intervention: an idea that is at odds with the Westphalian norm of sovereignty. While the United States and Europe have shown themselves willing to intervene with force to prevent humanitarian crises and nuclear proliferation, China has largely opposed such measures. Can China be convinced to support the West’s proposed changes to the world order, or will it cling to the traditional Westphalian norm?
The quest for improvement in the deeply troubled replationship between the United States and Pakistan focuses largely on Pakistan's role in Afghanistan and on the country's approach to governing.
Early in 2011, an overwhelming majority of American policymakers, opinion makers, and the public were strongly opposed to more military entaglements overseas, particularly a third war in a Muslim country.
However good the reasons for our intervention in Libya, we and our allies failed to stop some terrible deeds commiteed by the rebels we supported.
Point of Order
Is China More Westphalian Than the West?
Changing the Rules
G. John Ikenberry asks whether China will buy into the prevailing liberal, rule-based international order, which has been promoted and underwritten by the United States (“The Future of the Liberal World Order,” May/June 2011). With regard to one key element of this order, however— the Westphalian norm of sovereignty and nonintervention—he might have inverted the premise. For here, the West has been seeking major modifications that weaken the norm, whereas China has championed the established rule and the international order based on it.
Several leading Western progressives have sought to legitimize armed humanitarian intervention, under the rubric of “the responsibility to protect.” Others have gone even further, seeking to legitimize interference in the internal affairs of other countries if they develop nuclear arms, invoking “the duty to prevent.” Both concepts explicitly make sovereignty conditional on states’ conducting themselves in line with new norms that directly conflict with the Westphalian one. The issue, in other words, is not simply whether China will buy into the existing rule-based order but whether it can be persuaded to support the major changes in the rules that the West is seeking.
The past two decades have seen numerous humanitarian crises. The international community intervened with the use of force in some but not others. Many liberals were particularly troubled when the international community did not act to stop mass killings in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan, and their concerns led to calls for limitations on sovereignty in order to facilitate such action in the future. The Evans-Sahnoun Commission, an international study group on humanitarian intervention that released its report in 2001, and a 2004 UN secretary-general’s high-level panel formulated and promoted the idea that when states do not conduct their internal affairs in ways that meet internationally recognized standards, other states have a right to intervene. This idea has since been referred to in shorthand as “the responsibility to protect.” Writing in these pages in 2004, Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter (who would go on to serve as the U.S. State Department’s director of policy planning) called for further scaling back sovereignty by adding “the duty to prevent,” which would require countries to prevent other states from obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
China, in contrast, has consistently opposed all changes to the Westphalian norm about the primacy of national sovereignty. Ever since it abandoned its Mao-era policy of supporting communist and anti-imperialist insurgencies in other nations, Beijing has argued that national governments should be the sole legitimate users of force within their borders, which it holds is, in the words of the Chinese diplomat Wang Guangya, “a universally recognized norm of international law.” At the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated, “Respect for each other’s independence and sovereignty is vital to the maintenance of world peace.” During the Bosnian war, China was the only country not to vote in favor of the UN resolution authorizing a no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regarding Rwanda, China argued that any international intervention would require the consent of the Rwandan government. On Darfur, China insisted that no UN peacekeepers be sent without the consent of the government of Sudan. China joined France and Germany in criticizing U.S. President George W. Bush’s decision to wage war on Iraq and clearly favors political over military solutions when it comes to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs.
Progressive interventionist voices have weakened somewhat recently, not least because, as The Economist noted, “the Bush years . . . damaged the intellectual case for intervention.” Still, Hillary Clinton promised during her presidential campaign to “operationalize” the responsibility-to- protect doctrine and “adopt a policy that recognizes the prevention of mass atrocities as an important national security interest of the United States, not just a humanitarian goal.” And the Obama administration invoked the responsibility to protect in its case for intervention in Libya (although it has been at pains to point out that such intervention will not be a regular occurrence). Before the United States and other Western powers seek to determine whether China can be moved to support changes in the traditional liberal order, therefore, they need to sort out what their own position is.
If the Westphalian nonintervention norm is to be changed, the question arises as to who should decide when violations of national responsibilities have reached the level that justifies an armed intervention and on what criteria the decision will be made. The UN Security Council is often cited as the appropriate forum for such rulings. Thus, when NATO intervened in Kosovo without UN authorization, this action was referred to as legitimate by some but also as illegal. The 2003 invasion of Iraq faced much condemnation because it was not fully authorized by the UN. In contrast, interventions in East Timor and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the rollback of Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait were considered legal because of UN approval.
Reliance on the UN raises familiar issues: the five Security Council members that hold veto power do not include all the current major powers, and many UN members are themselves gross violators of human rights. But all other potential decision forums have even greater defects, so realistically, the Security Council will remain the authorizing institution of choice for the foreseeable future. As for what qualifies as a violation that justifies the breaching of sovereignty, the Sudanese scholar Francis Deng has suggested exempting from consideration those nations whose governments “strive to ensure for their people an effective governance that guarantees a just system of law and order, democratic freedoms, respect for fundamental rights, and general welfare.” But with the bar set so high, few nations would be ruled out as possible targets.
The Evans-Sahnoun Commission proposed that intervention require:
a) large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or b) large-scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.
It also recommended that any intervention be based exclusively on humanitarian intentions, be taken as a last resort, use only the minimum force necessary to complete the mission, and have reasonable prospects of success. Such a high bar might win China’s support, as reflected in a 2006 statement by China’s then UN ambassador, Liu Zhenmin, that supported the responsibility to protect as it pertains to “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” but insisted that “it is not appropriate to expand, willfully to interpret or even abuse this concept.”
With regard to the duty to prevent, the problem is whether the development or possession of any type of WMD by states without internal checks on their rulers would legitimate intervention or whether only specific kinds of WMD would qualify. Biological and chemical weapons are much more difficult to detect and control than nuclear ones. Hence, an international regime dedicated to preventing all WMD would have to be much more interventionist than one dedicated, at least initially, to preventing the proliferation of only nuclear arms.
A normative give-and-take with China will be more likely to bear fruit the more it is stressed that the new responsibility to prevent neither justifies forced regime change nor calls for bringing about democracy and enforcing human rights by the use of armed interventions. This means focusing on saving lives and not regime change. The right to life has a special standing, because all other rights are conditioned on it, but it is not conditioned on them.
At the same time that the West seeks to legitimize interventions to protect life, it should reject China’s claim that some nonlethal transnational acts, such as communications or educational and cultural exchanges, amount to prohibited interventions in a nation’s internal aaffairs. For instance, China misused the sovereignty argument when it vetoed a 2007 UN Security Council resolution calling for the Myanmar regime to allow unimpeded access to the country to humanitarian workers and release its political prisoners. Such resolutions do not violate traditional conceptions of Westphalian sovereignty, nor do they violate any international laws or shared understandings. On the contrary, they are sound means to gradually build an international community, in which shared norms develop out of nations and people expressing their appreciation and censure across state lines, just as China often does.
In short, Ikenberry and others are correct to see further incorporating China and other rising powers into the existing liberal world order as a crucial challenge for the decades to come. But liberals need to understand that changing the rules of the game in a progressively cosmopolitan direction will make accomplishing that task even more difficult than it might otherwise be.
Amitai Etzioni is University Professor and Professor of International Relations at George Washington University.
Amitai Etzioni’s thoughtful response to my essay makes the important point that China’s hesitations about the liberal world order center primarily on the ideas that the West has advanced in recent years about liberal interventionism, state sovereignty, and “the responsibility to protect.” Etzioni and I do not directly disagree—but we do differ on how to think about the significance of this tension in Sino-Western relations.
The main argument of my essay was that China and other rising non-Western developing states face an international order that is both wide and deep, the product of projects to build systems of global order. One is the Westphalian project, which over the centuries has developed rules and institutions for the management of great-power relations and the operation of the modern state system. The other is the more recent project of building an open and rule-based system organized around free trade, collective security, democratic solidarity, and institutionalized cooperation. Since World War II, this project has incorporated ideas about universal human rights, culminating in the recent emergence of the responsibility-to-protect norm.
Etzioni suggests that the West needs to soften its support for such new interventionist norms so as to entice China to join the existing order. But China already has more than enough reason to be enticed— and little reason to resist. The existing order is easy to join and hard to overturn. Rising states in past international orders never confronted such a deeply rooted and multifaceted system as China does today. This system presents Beijing with both massive constraints and huge opportunities.
China’s disagreement with the responsibility-to-protect norm also needs be put in perspective: that norm represents only a tiny aspect of the larger set of global rules and institutions. Indeed, in pushing back against this norm, China is invoking other norms and ideas in the system—most important, Westphalian ones about sovereignty. In doing so, China is being driven further into the existing international order. Moreover, the tension that exists within the international order between norms of state sovereignty and the responsibility to protect should not be surprising, and it is more of a virtue than a defect. Think about the internal politics of Western democracies. In all of them, there are tensions between competing norms, such as social equality and market freedom. But both of these are legitimate norms, and day-to-day politics involves the struggle over them.
It is also important to note that China’s position on sovereignty is evolving. Although Chinese leaders initially condemned the principle of the responsibility to protect, they endorsed it at the UN’s 2005 World Summit and later reaffirmed that support in UN Security Council Resolution 1674. This year, when the norm was invoked with regard to Libya, China did not veto the Security Council resolution that paved the way for NATO action. Rather than reject the norm, China has attempted to disassociate itself from U.S.- led military interventions aimed at regime change and link itself to un-led efforts to protect civilians. Chinese leaders realize that if decisions about humanitarian intervention are made in the UN Security Council—a quintessentially Westphalian institution—their country will have some ability to influence the outcomes. And as the world moves to a more multipolar system, countries other than the United States and its Western partners will increasingly be involved in decision-making regarding un operations—a shift that also gives China incentives to work with the new norm.
Meanwhile, as China grows in geo – political importance, its own strategic interests relating to interventionism will presumably also evolve. It is understandable that China, as a poor developing country, now sees the erosion of norms of sovereignty as a threatening symbol of American “liberal imperialism.” But as it becomes a global power, China will no doubt begin to see new sorts of dangers lurking in its strategic environment, such as weak states and nuclear proliferation. It may not fully embrace the human rights vision behind the evolving norms about state sovereignty, but it will appreciate the ability of the international community to act when these dangers become overwhelming.
Etzioni is correct in noting the tension between sovereignty and interventionism, but most of the Westphalian and liberal norms reinforce one another. The Bretton Woods institutions and the other postwar multilateral economic institutions, for example, are intended to strengthen the ability of national governments to manage and protect their domestic economies. Building a liberal world order does not mean erecting a world government and usurping state sovereignty; rather, it is an agenda for strengthening the fabric of the international system, infusing it with rules, institutions, and other tools with which governments can manage their economies and societies. Liberals should remember, more than they do, that this project is heavily dependent on the stable and well-functioning Westphalian system of states. As I mentioned in my essay, the problems of Hobbes must be solved before the promise of Locke can be realized.
It is in this sense that I agree with Etzioni. Western liberal internationalists and their governments need to remain focused on finding ways for states to navigate the turbulent waters of economic and security interdependence. And in doing this, they should engage China and seek ways to bridge their differences over norms of sovereignty and interventionism. After all, China and the West have no choice but to work within the current framework: there is no alternative world order lurking offstage that is as functional or legitimate as the existing one.
“China: Making an Adversary.” International Politics 48.6 (November 2011) p. 647-666.
The nation's bussinesses manage a significant share of online activity related to national security and must play a larger role in ensuring the overall integrity of the system.
Rarely are foreigh policy deliverations more affected by what seem like academic discussions, matters of definitions and debates that sound like scholasticism, than when one seeks to determine whether the leaders of a given nation are rational actors.
“Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?” International Affairs. 87:3 (May 2011). p. 539-553.
Reports suggest that local populations in some of the most contested areas in Afghanistan, including Kandahar, are most troubled by corruption that by the Taliban.
The relative power of the United States is declining-- because other nations are increasing their power and because the U.S economic challenges and taxing overseas commitments are weakening it.
When Americans and Iraqi army units were integrated to foster closer cooperation between the groups and to intensify Iraqis' training, a number of challenges arose with regard to the latrines they were to share.
There's a new and troubling idea afloat in the world of nuclear proliferation.
Many good people who have never fought in a war find somthing appealing in America's willingness to take more casualties in order to spare innocent civilian lives.
If fighting has to be done is it best done with remote controlled aircraft or drones? Some say unmanned planes improve the level of knowledge about targets, while others believe they are flying into serious legal turbulence and risking innocent lives.
The current crisis in Europe has led many to call for building stronger shared economic institutions and stronger EU governance. Actually what is missing most is a demos, a true sense of community. Binding EU-wide referendums on the same day in all the member states on issues of great importance are needed.
Increasing evidence that Iran has embarked on a course that will lead it to develop nuclear arms in the near future has reintensified the debate about the ways the world should react to such a danger.
During his first year in office, President Barack Obama has outlined a human rights doctrine. The essence of Obama’s position is that the foreign policy of the USA is dedicated to the promotion of the most basic human right—the right to life—above and beyond all others and that the USA will systematically refrain from actively promoting other rights, even if this merely entails sanctions or raising a moral voice. This article details and examines Obama’s position and assesses its normative standing.
The substantial increase in the employment of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other arenas has intensified the debate about the moral and legal nature of the targeted killing of people who are said to be civilians.
President Barack Obama has so far made only one strategic mistake, but it is a major one. It concerns the greatest security threat to the United States, other free nations, and world peace--nuclear arms in the hands of terrorists, as well as rogues and falling regimes.
In an article in May, The Economist praised France for resisting the worst effects of the global economic crisis. France and Germany appear to have fared well in comparison with Britan and the US.
By early December 2002, the U.S government knew that an unflagged ship, the So San, was transporting ballistic missiles and missile components from North Korea to the Middle East.
In current hostilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, parts of Pakistan, and elsewhere, from Columbia to the Horn of Africa, nonstate actors--in particular, terrorists and insurgents who act like terrorists
I arrived in Moscow from Washington highly optimistic, a day after the vigorous, historic handshake between Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama in London on April 1.
This essay focuses on the question of how to curb the tension betwee the rights of members of minorities and the particularistic values of the national community.
The main challenge currently facing the EU is a community deficit: the low valuation the majority of its citizens accord the evolving collectivity. The EU is challenged by the mismatch between its increasing supranational decision-making and the strong loyalties of its citizens to their respective nations states.
The European Council should revisit its call for schools to teach "at least two foreign languages from a very early age."
There is a widely held notion that public schools should not teach values.
To ask ‘Should Israel be a Jewish State?’ is like asking if the Pope must be a Catholic.
What do Russia, China, Afghanistan, and Iraq have in common?
As a former terrorist (in Palestine, 1946-47), let me tell you that Gordon Brown is right to extricate the UK from Iraq, but he is dead wrong when he argues that suicide bombers can be deterred in
Wilson Carey McWilliams was active in his church, political party, and government--all at the local level.
SOME REALISTS argue that if the United States promotes democracy in places such as Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the opening up of these polities would lead to more Islamist states.
Recently I participated in a lunch at the home of the Syrian government's representative to Washington, attended by a small group of people.
“Foreword.” A United Nations for the 21st Century: From Reaction to Prevention. Detlev Wolter. Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007.
Iran has a strong case when it maintains that it has an internationally recognized right to develop dual-use nuclear technologies, enrich uranium, and keep all the plutonium it wants.
Both neosconservatives and liberals have overestimated the extend to which one nation, even a superpower with United Nations support, can re-engineer regimes.
In contrast to the claim that the most signiﬁcant fault line in contemporary global affairs is between the civilisation of the West and all others, this essay argues that the schism between those who advance their values through violence and those who rely on persuasion, both of which are present in all civilisations, is the greatest source of conﬂict in the post-Cold-War era.
The 1990s saw numerous humanitarian crises around the world. The international community intervened in some of these, such as Kosovo, but did not in others, Rwanda being the prominent example.
Kandydaci w wyborach prezydenchkich 2008 rodi pracuja juz w terenie, a jednoczesnie zaczela sir debata o tym, jaki kierunek powinna obrac amerykanska polityka zagraniczna po Bushu.
Iran has had its say over the past few months, defiantly pronouncing to the rest of the world what it will or won't do regarding its nuclear program.
Following the implosion or removal of totalitarian regimes of the secular and religious varieties, we have witnessed an explosive growth in numerous forms of antisocial behavior.
The United States and its allies are involved in changing schooling in several Islamic countries, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also Pakistan and elsewhere. Specifically, the United States promotes and provides resources for changes in textbooks, teacher preparations, selection of school administrators, and general education policy.
Moral dialogs, social processes through which people form new shared moral understandings, occur not only within small communities, or even nation states, but also across national borders on a tran
The idea that governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens is gaining momentum and may change the way sovereignty has been perceived for centuries.
The question as to what is to become of the residences, clinics, schools and greenhouses of the Israeli settlers once they leave Gaza this summer may seem like a minor subplot in the epic struggle
If you are a hard-working and busy attorney, as most are, you may have little interest in reading about international treaties-especially as you correctly sense that they often are breached rather than observed. However, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does deserve your attention. The reason? The most significant threat to all you care about comes from terrorists who may well lay their hands on nuclear arms or materials from which they can be readily made.
The headlines from the Middle East these days are full of optimism.
“Affective Bonds and Moral Norms: A Communitarian Approach to the Emerging Global Society.” International Politics and Society, ed. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. (Verlag J.H.W.
Where do future humanitarian interventions fit into the evolving post9/11 new global architecture? To answer this question I ask: what are the main features of this architecture? In what directions is it propelled? Could these expected developments accommodate more forthcoming and more effective humanitarian interventions than we have seen in the past?
One should not reject Turkey membership in the EU on the grounds that it is an unsuitable member for this community of free nations but rather because one recognizes that precisely because Turkey h
Ever since I was a student in the early 1950s, I have been told that a world government is a dream of dewy-eyed idealists, a vision no serious perso
Recent months have seen desperate attempts by the Western nations to stop North Korea and Iran joining the nuclear club. These two nations remain on George Bush's Axis of Evil.
Courts-martial of American soldiers accused of having tortured or killed Iraqis and Afghans continue. The solders often claim that they merely followed orders.
When the Israeli Supreme Court ruled in June that the country's security fence violated Palestinian rights and international law, Israel's many critics in the world cheered.
President Bush has repeatedly said we will grant "full and complete sovereignty" to Iraq on June 30.
When countries like Afghanistan or Iraq are liberated from either a religious or a secular tyranny,
"Free trade" is God's gift to modern economics, and for a politician to support "fair trade" is tantamount to worshiping graven images.
The Bush administration plans to put before the next Group of Eight meeting and ambitious program to democratize the "greater Middle East".
“A Self-Restrained Approach to Nation-Building by Foreign Powers.” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1 (January 2004) pp. 1-17.
The central thesis of this essay is that nation-building -- however defined-- by foreign powers can rarely be accomplished and tends to be very costly, not merely in economic resources and those of political capital, but also in human lives.
“Vigilant Public, Press Keep Anti-Terror Efforts From Going Too Far” USA Today (October 28, 2003) p. 23A.
Because I feel strongly that our government should do more to protect us from the next terrorist attack, I often find myself on television debating representatives of the ACLU and archconservatives such as former congressman Bob Barr.
The United States, in Iraq and elsewhere, should cease promoting a secular civil society as the only alternative to a Taliban-like Shia theocracy. We cannot quell the religious yearnings of millions of Iraqis (and many other elsewhere) merely by fostering strong political and economic institutions and the sound values they embody--to wit, democracy and capitalism.
“Our Unfinished Post-9/11 Duty” The Christian Science Monitor (September 11, 2003) p. 9. Also published as “How Secure Is Our Homeland?,” in Deseret Morning News (Utah) (September 14, 2003) p. AA03
Two years have passed without a new attack on our homeland, and Americans are increasingly complacent.
“Dial Down U.S. Involvement in Iraq” USA Today (August 27, 2003) p. 11A.
As of Tuesday, the number of U.S casualties incurred after the end of major combat operations in Iraq exceeds those we suffered during the war.
“Stop Obsessing over Saddam” USA Today (August 12, 2003) p. 13A.
Bernard Trainor, a retired Marine Corps general and mailitary analyst, called the deaths of Saddam Hussien's sons Uday and Quasay "a tremendous blow to the Baathist regime and a real boon for those Iraquis seeking a Saddam-free future.
“A Fence to Make Good Neighbors” Christian Science Monitor (August 6, 2003) p. 9.
Instead of chiding Israel for building a fence between its territory and the land on which the Palestinian state is to be formed, the United States should welcome it.
“Don’t Separate Mosque and State” Los Angeles Times (June 16, 2003) p. A11.
The United States should cease promoting a secular civil society as the only alternative to a Taliban-like theocracy in Iraq.
“Gemäßigten Islam im Irak unterstützen” (Support Moderated Islam in Iraq)Süddeutsche Zeitung Nr. 120 (May 26, 2003).
The United States in Iraq should cease promoting a secular civil society as the only alternative to a Taliban-like Shia theocracy.
“Iran May Present Greater Threat than Iraq” USA Today (December 10, 2002). p. 24A.
Much attention has been paid to the dangers posted by North Korea and Iraq, which this past weekend turned over a 1,200-page report to the United Nations that declared it had no weapons of mass destruction.
“Killing Christians” The Weekly Standard (November 11, 2002). p. 20.
On October 17, bombs killed 6 people and wounded 143 in Zamboanga, the Philippines. While press accounts mentioned in passing that the victims were CHristians, few conveyed to the reader that these were people assaulted by Muslim extremists because of their religion.
“Harsh Lessons in Incivility.” The Chronicle of Higher Education; The Chronicle Review. (November 1, 2002) pB14-15
This semester, the hottest class on campuses coast to coast is a course in incivility.
“Seeking Middle Ground on Privacy Versus Security” Christian Science Monitor (October 15, 2002). p. 9.
Since Sept. 11, discussion has swirles around whether Americans have sacrificed too many rights to shore up on national security.
“Safety Cards” American Enterprise (June 1, 2003) p. 7-8.
In March 2003 the FBI issued a worldwide alert for Adnan El Shukrijumah, who is sought for questioning in connection with possible terrorist threats against the United States.
“In and Out” National Review Online (October 3, 2002).
A major reason policymakers and the public are told we should not exorcize Saddam is that after we rid the world of him, we will have to stay in Iraq, at huge costs and risks. Phebe Marr, author of The Modern History of Iraq, testified before the Senate that if the U.S. embarks on this project, it needs to be prepared to see it through to an acceptable outcome - including, if necessary, a long-term military and political commitment to ensure a stable and more democratic government.
“Mobilize America’s Foot Soldiers” The Christian Science Monitor (July 25, 2002) p 9.
Congress is busy creating a Department of Homeland Security. But another new federal entity that could be making a vital contribution is barely mentioned: the Citizen Corps.
“Lowering Membership Bar Cheapens ‘Democracy’” USA Today (July 25, 2002) p 13A.
President Bush's recent demand that Palestinians replace Yasser Arafat with a new leader before the next steps can be taken toward peace in the Middle East raises a crucial question: Should we seek to unseat any democratically elected leader?
“Show US Mettle in Pakistan” The Christian Science Monitor (July 18, 2002) p 13.
The credibility of American power is being tested these days not in Iraq, but in north Pakistan.
“Throw Book at Terrorists Who Hide as Civilians” USA Today (July 3, 2002) p 13A.
In 1946, before the establishment of the state of Israel, I served in an underground unit (PalMach) of the Jewish community. We were fighting the British, who ruled over Palestine in those days.
President Bush has offered a fine plant that, at best, will take years to implement. For now, a fence will make all the difference.
Iran now tops the State Department's list of seven terrorist-sponsoring states. After 10 days in Iran - four cities, 60 interviews - I have little doubt that the United States is better off engaging Iran, as it does China, rather than trying to isolate it, as it does Iraq.
Many of the responses by the Catholic Church to pedophilia among its ranks implicitly assume that it is a curable disease.
Given the rise in transnational problems and the inadequacy of the old, intergovernmental system, scholars are searching for a new, post-cold war global architecture. The 2001 anti-terrorism coalition presents a new architecture -the semi-empire -which is dominated by one nation (or a small group of nations) that
pressures other nations to follow the course it sets, and has a limited number of missions. The article explores the possibility that the coalition could expand to tackle other transnational problems besides terrorism. Given the coalition's lack of scope and legitimacy, other options are explored that might be more effective and legitimate.
If you want to get a feeling for why America's allies are rapidly peeling off from supporting the war on terrorism, the following presonal account may help.
Now that President Bush has sent Secretary of State Colin Powell to stop the bloodshed in the Middle East, my advice to him and all of us -- based on the 21 years that I lived in Isreas - is that we stop asking who is in the right.
Every time you believe the mindless bloodshed in the Middle East has reached an incredible height, you wake up to find that the horror escalated some more.
President Bush, in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly this past weekend, said for this first time that the USA was "working toward the day when two states -- Israel and Palestine -- live peacefully together within secure and recognized borders.
The United States has been scaling back its bombing on Fridays, the Muslim Sabbath. And only of after much public agonizing has the Bush administration decided to continue bombing during the Muslims' holy month of Ramadan.
A friend who works as a high-ranking public-information (that is, publicity) officer for the U.S. Army told me that he does not expect to be sent any place near Afghanistan, because "we plan to release as little information as possible, or less."
“A Proud American Moment” The Christian Science Monitor (October 11, 2001) p 9.
On Wednesday, Sept. 12, only one day after the assault on America, newspapers caried extensive reports about attacks on Muslim Americans.
References to world government have long been treated as utopian notions held by a few visionaries. This much-dismissed vision is re-examined here in light of the fact that self-determination based on national governments, to the extent that it existed a generation ago, is increasingly curtailed by transnational developments.
“USA Can’t Impose Democracy on Afghans” USA Today (October 10, 2001) p 15A.
With the best of intentions, numerous U.S. public officials are busy plotting the future of the Afghan government and society.
“A New Cold War” The Boston Globe (September 27, 2001) p A15.
(Reprinted in The Jerusalem Post, October 5, 2001.)
International terrorism will not be greatly diminished until we help open the societies that sponsor terrorists and that terrorize their own people.
Nationalism must be ended. It is a creed that has come to burden the expansion of globalism (as evident for instance in the demonstrations agains WTO); hobbles the growth of the European Community (as seen in the votes against the Euro in Denmark); stands in the way of resolving violent conflicts (for instance, over the fate of Jerusalem); complicated the resolution of differences within existing nation-states (for example, in Corsica); and turn refugees and immigrants into a threat to the receiving countries.
Condemning Austria's inclusion of an extreme right-wing party in its government is fully justified -- and woefully insufficient. Censure by the European Community is welcome -- and utterly inadequate. Anybody who believes that we can embarrass or pressure the Austrians into treating their xenophobic party as a pariah had better think again.
Condemning Austria's inclusion of an extreme right-wing party in its government is fully justified -- and woefully insufficient. Censure by the European Community is welcome -- and utterly inadequate. Anybody who believes that we can embarrass or pressure the Austrians into treating their xenophobic party as a pariah had better think again.
One theme united many of the divergent groups that participated in the "Battle in Seattle" last week: As they saw it, the United States was, again, sacrificing its sovereignty to satisfy yet another international organization. And President Clinton confirmed their worst suspicions when he stated that he was looking forward to the day when the World Trade Organization (WTO) would be able to impose sanctions on nations.
Gradually, and to some extent inadvertently, the United States has been developing a new role in the post cold war world.
The impeccably proper German official is visibly impatient. Holding open the door to the nearest of a fleet of black Mercedes that were waiting, he rushes us in- "Surely we do not want to keep the president waiting."
Intelligence sources in Washington openly predict what will happen next in the Balkan tribal war. As the Serbians consolidate their holdings in Bosnia, they are expected to try to drive out the 200,000 Albanians that live in Kosovo, and go after western Macedonia, a region where many Serbs live and that many Serb nationalists see as part of a “Greater Serbia.” If we are to avoid standing by as thousands more civilians are slaughtered, and thousands more are driven from their homes, we must act now.
At first I did not have any inkling that Bogdan Walewski wanted to involve me in an international intrigue. He introduced himself over the phone as the second secretary of the Polish Mission to the United Nations.
Poland is the only country in Eastern Europe that is attempting to rush from a command-and-control economy to a free-market economy. All the other countries have chosen a gradual transition. My prediction is that Poland will not make it. I base my prediction on sociological, psychological and political factors as well as economics. This broader perspective is a long way from American neoclassical economic theory, on which the “jump now” advice to Poland is based.
After a lifelong affiliation with the Democratic Party and its ideals, I am packing. And I am not alone.
After 25 years of living in the United states (as an immigrant from Israel, often considered an Italian), I still cannot get used to the loose security of my adopted country. Married to a Hispanic, I often run into citizens of Mexico and El Salvador who walked into the country across the Rio Grande. On campus, I teach students from Iran and assorted Palestinians who simply stayed in the United States after their visas expired.
Defense analysts have long understood the need to keep careful watch over the defense industry and the role it plays in shaping our military policy. Yet few people seem to have noticed the disturbing way that many defense contractors are encouraging the Government to neglect preparations for conventional war and thus rely increasingly on nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, so far, most of our protection has been of the wrong kind.
In early 1979 the Carter administration found itself facing a refugee crisis as mounting political tensions throughout Southeast Asia increased the number of people seeking asylum in America. Refugees began arriving in the spring of 1975 after the collapse of noncommunist regimes in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The flow subsided somewhat until 1978, when renewed fighting generated a new wave of refugees. Thousands of ethnic Chinese fled Vietnam after the war erupted between Vietnam and China in 1979, and Vietnamese expansion also created a new flow of refugees from Laos and Cambodia into Thailand.
NOBODY HAS YET recommended that Americans wear kimonos to work, spend their evenings with bar girls or eat rice with short sticks. Never mind that most Japanese don't do these things either. In the present mania to do things the way the Japanese do, such subtleties are quickly overlooked. An intellectual fashion is like a disco pants fad: Everybody gets into it, whether it fits or not.
Developmental economics is the study of the evolution of modern economies in preciously underdeveloped countries.
Despite some recent success in the Mideast peace talks, the President still has to learn that it takes more than a few prayers and public appeals to pass legislation in this mundane world.
I do not know who started it, but in 1972 the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a lengthy inquiry into my past. Someone had charged that "Etzioni had made statements critical of the United States' foreign policy, that he had defended the position of Red China and the Soviet Union, and had made unwarranted accusations against the military and intelligence organizations of the United States."
New York finds itself squeezed, this time, by an American OPEC.
Not many outsiders know about the small, sprited band of optimists-called Team A- that the Defense Department keeps hidden away inside the Pentagon.
Like a ghost returned from a grave, a debate which ran high in the Fifties and early Sixties returns to haun American policymakers, intellectuals and concrened citicens: COuld we ever be the first to strike the enemy with nuclear weapons?
Daily predictions about "the next oil-embargo" - what the Arabs will do if the next round of Kissinger negotiation fails, what the international price of a barrel of oil will be in 1983 or our energy needs over the next 10 years-pay little heed to our demonstrated inability to predict such developments in the past.
Last Sunday I met three would-be bombers, two young men and a young woman whom I'll call Jim, Dick and Sally.
To keep afloat the hope for peace negotiations between Egypt, Jordan and Israel, several devices have been suggested, all of which, thus far, are designed to cost Egypt more than it is willing to pay.
The study of the conditions under which a just and stable peace can be achieved constitutes the main core of contemporary analysesof international relations; hence, the following discussion focuses on the issues and problems in applying social psychology to the prevention of war.
Many American observers see the new application of Britain for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) as a morality play.
Before I left New York in February, a colleague who knew that I was concerned about the fate of Soviet Jewry told me, "Be sure to see Shamburg."
Strategy sets forth principles for the selection and employment of resources and power in the pursuit of given goals, and also specifies priorities among these goals.
The United States appears to be considering an expansion of the use of chemical weapons in Vietnam.
It is becoming commonplace to state that a Western strategy that assumes or seeks to foster a bi-polar world is obsolescent.
It is becoming commonplace to state that a Western strategy that assumes or seeks to foster a bi-polar world is obsolescent.
The advocate of general and complete disarmament can find little support for their stand in human history, political science, or contemporary international relations.
The familiar voice of the WQXR radio announcer opened the 8 a.m. news on January 30, 1964, with a statement that the United States was charging that Soviet aircraft had brutally shot down an unarmed American jet training plane over East Germany on January 29, causing the death of three officers.
“European Unification and Perspectives on Sovereignty,” Daedalus, Vol. 92, No. 3 (Summer 1963), pp. 498-520. Reprinted in The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 11 (1964), pp. 120-122.
A model for functional analysis of social change is provided to supplement the Parsons-Bales-Smelser differentiation model.
There is room for unilateral action to improve international relations in areas other than nuclear test bans, the cessation of bomb production, or general disarmament.
The struggle for national independence is often led by a charismatic movement.
Each generation seems to work out its own definition of democracy.
A process of the differentiation in the social structure of the communal settlements of Israel (Kibbutz) is related to functional differentiation of the elites.
Educational techniques are closely relatcd to the values and the structure of the society in which education takes place. As a society changes, techniques are altered or abandoned, and new techniques are introduced. Israel furnishes an illuminating example of the effect of social change on educational method.
The agricultural sector of Israel's Jewish population is not very large; nevertheless the role of agriculture in the political life of the country is of the utmost importance.
“The Organizational Structure of the Kibbutz,” Niv HaKevutza, Vol. 6, No. 3 (August 1957), pp. 412-433; Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1957), pp. 658-682 (in Hebrew).
The aim of this paper is to explain the wide differences in solidarity observed in working groups on collective settlements (Kibbutzim) in Israel.
“The Organizational Structure of Educational Institutions,” Megamot Child Welfare Research Quarterly, Vol. VII, No. 3 (July 1956), pp. 244-253 (in Hebrew).